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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF T'HE STATE OF UTAH 
rr,AI(ATARO SHIBA, 1fiYOE 
SHIBA, 
Plaintiffs, 
-YS.-
JOHN WEISS, HENDRY D. SPEN-
CER and HELEN BETHERS, 
Defendants. 
Appellants' Brief 
PRELil\IINARY STArr,ElVIENT 
Case 
No. 8247 
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court by the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett, dismissing the action upon its merits. This 
trial involved the consolidation of four law suits grow-
ing out of this particular accident, namely cases 98655, 
·which is this case, 99868, 99687 and 99291. 
FACTS 
The follo,ving facts out of \Yhich this case arises are 
established without serious dispute. This case grows out 
of an accident involving a truck and t-\vo cars, a few miles 
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west of the Stra,vberry Reservoir. rrhe truck involved 
was owned by defendant Weiss, and \vas being driven 
easterly along High\Yay 40 toward the Stra,vberry Reser-
voir. The Shimoda car \Vas traveling east in the same 
direction and following the truck. The Bether 's car was 
traveling westerly. The Shimoda car struck the truck 
"\xt~hich was parked "\vithout lights and the Bether 's car 
then ran into the Shimoda car. The plaintiffs are the 
father and mother of one Y oshiro George Shiba, who 
resided in Salt Lake City, and the defendant John Weiss, 
is the O"\vner of a 1946 Dodge Pickup (Tr. 58), which he 
allowed the defendant to take on the early morning of 
October 19, 1953. (Tr. 166). The defendant Dellis Spen-
cer resides at Neola, Utah, but V\70rked at rrodd Park (Tr. 
81). Defendant Spencer left the \V eiss home in Salt Lake 
City about 3:10 A. M. on October 19, 1953, (Tr. 82), and 
drove the truck on the \vay to his home, proceeding 
through Parleys Canyon to IIeber and out · through 
Daniels Canyon, to\vard the Stra-\vberry. Defendant 
Spencer drove the truck about a half a mile past the 
last turn before coming to the \vest entrance of Bull 
Springs Road and High\vay 40. (Tr. 86). At a point 
approximately 750 feet west of the entrance of the 
Bull Springs Road into Highway 40, the lights of the 
Weiss truck, being driven hy Spencer, \vent out, while 
traveling on the right hand side of the road. (Tr. 89). 
The defendant then applied the brakes and clutch and 
brought the car to rest traveling about 12 or 15 feet (Tr. 
90), stopping with t'vo "'"heels off the hard surface of 
the road, about a. foot and a half or two feet off of the 
road and \vith the "rheels on the hard surface, not parallel 
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\vith the shoulder. ( Tr. 91). After the Spencer truck 
came to rest it was struck in the rear by the Shimoda 
car, and while the Shimoda car was traveling from the 
initial impact, the Shimoda car then had a collision with 
the Bether's car, traveling in a westerly direction. (Tr. 
98). The Weiss truck \Vas being driven by l\fr. Spencer 
himself. The Shimoda car, traveling in an easterly direc-
tion was occupied by the O\vner, Mr. Shimoda and 1\Ir. 
Shiba, and the Bether 's car, traveling westerly, was 
driven by Miss Bethers, and had as occupants, John 
Osborne and ~lr. Iorg, the owner. The accident occurred 
at about 5:50 A. ~I., on the morning of October 19, 1953. 
The occupants of the Shimoda car \Vere killed, and the 
owner of the Iorg car was killed. 
Other undisputed facts are that the highway at the 
scene of the accident \Vas 22 feet "ride, a barro\v pit on 
either side of the road, and that the point of impact was 
determined by Officer Mason Hill, at approximately 6:50 
A. M., after the accident from the debris, oil marks and 
gouges in the road. 
As to most of the other facts in the case, there is a 
sharp dispute in the evidence. Chiefly as to whether or 
not Shiba or Shimoda \Vas the driver of the Shimoda 
automobile. 
Officer Mason Hill, \vho investigated the accident, 
was called by Mr. Lowe, the attorney for the adminis-
trator of the Iorg Estate, Case No. 99686, which was one 
of the four cases consolidated for trial. Mr. Hill arrived 
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at the scene of the accident about 40 minutes after it 
happened, and upon cross-examination of the witness by 
Mr. Hanson, attorney for the respondent, testified as 
follows: 
"Q. N O\V, with reference to the Japanese car, 
did you make any observation of the people in 
that car~ 
A. I did. 
Q. Just tell the court and jury ,,~hat you sa'v 
and \vhere those people \Vere in the car. 
A. Well, the youngest Japanese boy by the 
name of Shiba \vas laying in the front of the car 
under the steering ,,-heel \vith his buttocks still 
on the seat and his head do\vn on the floor ( Tr. 
24) boards, ~nd-
Q. And \vhere was-just go ahead, sir . 
. A. -and the older of the J apanese-I don't 
recall his name right now-he \Vas hanging out 
of the right front corner of the car, which had 
been torn away. He \vas hanging out there, and 
he had bled to death there. There was a pool of 
blood on the highway wh.ere he had bled to death 
hanging out of the car." (Tr. 25) 
On further cross exan1ination by ~Ir. Beatie, the 
witness testified as follo\vs: 
'' Q. And in response to a question of l\lr. 
Hanson, you stated that the position of the bodies 
of the t'vo Japanese, Shimoda and Shiba, in the 
car were the same as at the time the cars came 
to rest after the impact. You don't know that to 
be a fact of your O"\Vn knowledge, do you? 
A. No." (Tr. 46) 
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'' Q. You didn't check the back seat, did you, 
l\Ir. Hill, at the scene of the accident~ 
A. No, I don't think I did. 
Q. Yon don't know w"hether there Vilas blood 
in the back sent or not, do you~ 
A. No, I dont. (Tr. 65) 
Donald A. Harris, a mail truck driver was the first 
person at the scene of the aecident, and testified on 
direct examination for the appellant as follows: 
Q. Which car? 
A. The car sitting crossways of the road, the 
car ""ith the Japanese fello,vs in it, and I shined 
my light on the face of the car, and I could see 
that the one fello'v \Vas hanging out of the car, 
and then it made me sick, and I turned away from 
it for just a fe·w· short seconds. I \Vas sick to my 
stomach, and just then this other guy arrived on 
the scene. He was a deer hunter. 
Q. \\1"'ith relation to this particular man, do 
you kno'v which direction he came from l\Ir. 
Harris? 
A. He came from Daniels Canyon. He \vas 
traveling in the same direction as I was. 
Q. What did you do, and \vhat did you ohserveo? 
it. Well, I seen that this car crossed the road, 
and all I done is \Vent around and shined my light 
on the guy hanging out the door, and that is as 
far as I observed the \vreck at all. 
Q. Did you observe anyone else in the front 
seat of the Shimoda car'? 
_.:\_. No, I didn't. ('Tr. 69-70) 
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Q. What did he do \Yith the flashlight, and 
'vha t \Vas said' 
A. \V ell, before he got the flashlight, he said, 
"Is anybody else hurt~'' and I says, "I don't 
kno\v. I haven't looked.'' That \\7aS when I "ras 
sick, pretty upset about it, so he got my light and 
walked around the other side of the car. 
Q. Now, that is the Shimoda car'? 
.A .. Yes. 
Q. Yes. What did he do, and "l"hat \Vas said 1 
.. A.. l-Ie shined his light in, and he said, ''There 
is another guy in the back seat. In the back'' is 
what he said. ''There is another guy in the back.'' 
I took it for granted he meant more or less in the 
back seat. (Tr. 74) 
This witness on redirect examination stated: 
Q. Will you tell me then "?hat this man did 
\vith relation to your flashlight? 
A. He took my light and "Talked to the other 
side of the car. 
Q. \Vhat car o] 
.. A. The Shimoda car.'' ( R. 79) 
"Q. Is that the time that he told you there \\~as 
a J ap dead in the back ? 
.A. Who told me ·J 
Q. rrhis deer hunter . 
... \. Yes. 
Q. Are you sure that the deer hunter had not 
used his flashlight to look into the Bethers car at 
that time and seen ~ir. Iorg in the back seat there 1 
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A. I don't know whether he did or not. 
Q. In other words, he could have been refer-
ring to someone in the Bethers car as well as the 
Japanese car when he came up to you, could he 
not~ 
A. He could have been.'' 
On the question of the position of the cars, Officer 
Hill on cross examination testified as follows: 
'' Q. Do yon know whether or not those men, 
either of them had been moved before you arrived 
on the scene~ 
A. No, they had not.'' ( Tr. 25) 
On further cross examination by l\Ir. Beatie the 
officer testified as follows: 
''Q. You haYe no way of knowing how many 
people had been at the scene of the accident and 
had left or had arrived at the scene of the acci-
dent prior to your arrival at approximately six 
thirty~ 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. And you do not kno\\"' whether or not the 
automobiles "rere in the exact position as they 
finally came to rest after both the first and second 
impact or \vhether they had been moved, do you~ 
.A.. No, I do11t." ( Tr. 46) 
* :!(: * 
Q. You don't kno\v \vhether the respective cars 
had been moved from one position to another and 
were in different position at the time you arrived 
at six thirty or not, do you 1 
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\ "T , ' (R 4~) ....:_\._. ...._, 0. . I 
The second point is the restriction of counsel for 
appellant by the Hon . ....:.\.. H. Ellett in requiring him to 
consolidate with Counsel :IYir. W a tkiss and ~lr. Y ano, 
who represented Reade Shimoda, administratrix of the 
Estate of George Shimoda as a party defendant in case 
No. 99687. 
"THE COURT: ..._!\Jl counsel have passed the 
jury for cause, you may strike three challenges. 
I believe that is for each car, isn't it. Counsel 
interested in the same side 'vill have to join in 
the challenge. ( Tr. 12) 
THE COURT: The parties in the car proceed-
ing easterly that ran into the truck "\\.,.ould have 
three, and the parties in the car coming westerly 
"\\.,.ould have three. 
MR. BE1\._TIE: The only thing, there is in-
volved this "'ay-there are t,,~o different suits. 
Shimoda has one. I believe I "\vould be entitled to 
at least in my suit, which is a death case, to three 
challenges in favor of the Shibas, ''"'ould I not1 
You mentioned the-
THE COUR,T: 1,.. ou are going to 'vin together 
or lose together, aren ~t you? 
1\IIi. BE .I\_ TIE: ~\ ot of necessit.v. I have the 
- t' 
question of the guest arising "\Yhich is a sole-
with my case alone, \,..our Honor. The others are 
not involved in any guest question. 
THE COURT: That is right, you \\70uld have 
the question of guest, but, after all, you have got 
to sho'v the negligence on the other part. 
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~IR. BEATIE: That's true. I was just won-
dering if I have to associate my challenges with 
l\Ir. Watkiss and Mr. Yano, though, how we are 
going to split it. I might want two and they want 
t\vo, and \Ve \vouldn 't come out right. ( Tr. 13) 
~IR. BEATIE: To that ruling, Your Honor, 
just as a matter of record, may I have an excep-
tion?" (Tr. 14) 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
1. rri-IAT YOSHIRA GEORGE SHIBA, WHILE 
DRIVING AN AUT01tiOBILE OWNED BY GEORGE 
SHI~IODA, ~EGLIGENTLY DROVE SAID AUTO-
MOBILE INTO THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
2. ERROR IN REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO 
CONSOLIDATE THEIR PREEMPTORY CHAL-
LENGES WITH THE DEFENDANT SHIMODA IN 
ANOTHER ACTION WHICH WAS CONSOLIDATED 
AT TRIAL. 
This point is moot unless the first point is found 
in favor of appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THAT YOSHIRA GEORGE SHIBA, 
WHIL:BJ DRIVING AN AUT01IOBILE OWNED BY 
GEORGE SHIMODA, NEGLIGENTLY DROVE SAID 
.AlJTO?\IOBILE INTO THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCI<: 
AS A MATTER OF I.JAW. 
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It is apparent from the holding of the court that the 
court must have concluded that Shiba was the driver of 
the Shimoda automobile and was therefore guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law under the rule of Dalley 
vs. Mid West Dairy Products Company. It is our posi-
tion that the evidence is not conclusive on this question. 
The testimony of Mason W. Hill, the investigating 
officer who arrived on the scene at least 40 minutes after 
the accident happened, is contrary to the evidence of 
Donald Harris, who was the first known person to arrive 
at the scene of the accident, and testified as to the state-
ment which he heard the deer hunter make after he had 
borrowed his flashlight, "That there was a dead man in 
the back of the car. ' ' The court seems to have taken the 
position that the testimony of Officer Hill was conclusive 
of the position of the bodies at the time of the accident, 
and upon this point counsel disagrees with the trial court. 
I~ is the contention of appellants that the conflict in 
testimony a.s to the driver of the Shimoda automobile 
is a jury question there being a conflict in the testimony 
as aforesta ted. 
It is said in Sec. 325, 33 Am. eJur., page 263: 
"U11certain Proof: Conflict of Evidence. 
"A motion for nonsuit should be granted only 
""here there is no contriety of evidence as to the 
facts, and not '"'here the evidence raises a question 
for the jury." 
Sec. 1126-53 Am. J ur. 782: 
10 
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d Decision at Close of Plaintiff's Testimony; 
Nonsuit. 
''A motion to take a case from the jury on the 
ground of the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evi-
dence should be denied, 'vhere there is evidence 
which justifies an inference of facts upon which 
hi8 right to recover depends.'' 
In the fairly recent case of Winegar v. Slim Olson, 
Inc., 252 Pac. ( 2d), page 205, Justice McDonough stated 
as follo,vs at page 206: 
''In ruling on a motion for nonsuit it is well 
established that where a jury sits the court must 
accept as true the evidence in behalf of the plain-
tiff, and must give the plaintiff the benefit of 
every fair and legitimate inference that could be 
drawn therefrom by the jury. McGarry v. Tanner 
& Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P. 93; Smith v. Colum-
bus Buggy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 580; Dunn v. 
Salt Lake. & 0. R,. Co., 47 Utah 137, 151 P. 979; 
Kitchen v. Kitchen, 83 Utah 370, 28 P. 2d 180. If 
at th~ conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the 
court decides that the plaintiff has not established 
a prima facie case or cause of action against the 
defendant a judgment of nonsuit may be properly 
entered. Ibid. In order to establish a prima facie 
case the plaintiff must present some competent 
evidence on every element needed to make out the 
cause of action. The test is 'vhether or not there 
is some substantial evidence in support of every 
essential fact which a plaintiff is required to prove 
in order to entitle him to recover. Robinson v. 
Salt T_)ake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 P. 817. If the 
evidence and the inferences are of such character 
as would authorize reasonable men to arrive at 
different conclusions as to "vhether all the essen-
tial facts were or were not proved then the ques-
11 
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tion is one for the jury and a non-suit should be 
denied. Robinson v. Salt Lake City, supra." 
From the foregoing, it is contended by the appel-
lants that there being a conflict in the evidence as to the 
driver of the Shimoda automobile, that it was error for 
the court to nonsuit the plaintiff at the conclusion of the 
evidence adduced in the four consolidated cases on the 
part of plaintiffs. 
The appellant contends that reasonable men could 
have arrived at different conclusions as to whether or not 
Shiba was the driver of the Shimoda car and therefore 
it was a jury question. 
POINT II. ERROR IN REQUIRING APPELLANTS 
TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR PRE-EMPTORY CHAL-
LENGES WITH THE DEFENDANT SHIMODA IN 
ANOTHER ACTION WHICH WAS CONSOLIDATED 
AT TRIAL. 
' 
This point is moot unless the first point is found 
in favor of appellants. 
On the question of pre-emptory challenges to the 
jury, the Utah Statute is as follows: 
Rule 47, Subsection (c), U.C . ..L\_. 1953: Either 
party may challenge the jurors, but \vhere there 
are seYeral parties on either side, they must join 
in a challenge before it can be made. 
The above statute is a combination of the former 
statutes 104-24-2 and 104-24-3, U.C . .z\. 1943. 
12 
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In the case of Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Ut. 85, 
249 Pac. 437, the same statutes were involved as are 
herein set forth. In this case the two parties defendant 
were required to combine their challenges and while in 
the present case appellant was required to combine his 
challenges with a party defendant in another action, the 
basis of adjudication being that they were involved in 
the same automobile. 
The court in that case said at page 458: 
"Such cases as the one at bar are not of fre-
quent occurrence. When, however, such cases do 
occur, it is not a satisfactory reason to say a sub-
stantial right should be denied because it may 
possibly lead to subsequent abuses. I am irr~sis­
tibly impressed with the conviction that the rule 
announced by the courts of Texas, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin, which I have briefly reviewed in this 
opinion, is more consonant with reason and jus-
tice, and therefore more likely to have been within 
the intent of our Legislature, than is the rule 
invoked in behalf of respondent. The statute 
which requires the ''parties on either side to join'' 
should only be regarded as a precaution to the 
trial court to see that the right of severance in 
challenges shall not be permitted except in cases 
where it is manifest from the very nature of the 
case, that even-handed justice requires it. 
I am of opinion the challenge should have been 
allowed, and that the denial thereof was preju-
dicial error.'' 
In the case of Maddox vs. Pattison, 186 So. 894, the 
court said: 
13 
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''This action arose out of a collision between 
two trucks. Mrs. Maddox and Buckline instituted 
separate suits against defendant on separate 
causes of action. It is true the proceedings grew 
out of the same vehicular collision, and the issues 
in both causes respecting the defendant's liabilitv 
are identical, yet on the other hand, it is to b~ 
noted that the issues pertaining to the extent of 
the injuries sustained are not the same, the parties 
litigant are different and separate judgments were 
and are required to be rendered. 
"The D. S. Supreme Court offered the follow-
ing pertinent remark in the case of Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. vs. Hillman, 145 U.S. 283, 12 S. Ct. 909, 
912, 36 L. Ed. 706-707. ''But although the de-
fendants might lawfully be compelled at the dis-
cretion of the court to try the cases together, the 
causes of action remained distinct, and required 
separate verdicts and judgments, and no defend-
ant could be deprived, without its consent, of any 
right, material to its defense, whether by way of 
challenge to jurors or of objection to evidence, to 
which it would have been entitled if the cases had 
been tried separately. Sec. 819 of the revised 
statutes provides that in all civil cases each party 
shall be entitled to three pre-emptory challenges, 
and in all eases 'vhere there are several defend-
ants, or several plaintiffs, the parties on each 
side shall be deemed a single party for the pur-
poses of all challenges and under this section, 
under this provision, defendants sued together 
upon one cause of action, would be entitled to 
three pre-emptory challenges in all. But defend-
ants in different actions cannot be deprived of 
their several challenges, by the order of the court, 
made for the prompt and c.onvenient administra-
tion of justice, that the three cases shall be tried 
together.'' 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in the rna tter of directing a nonsuit against the plaintiff 
and invading the province of the jury in so ruling, and 
that if this point is sustained, that the court erred in 
requiring appellant to consolidate his challenges with a 
defendant in another action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE 
.Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
.Appellants. 
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